RIGHT TO RECALL

RIGHT TO RECALL

·         The right to recall is one of the facets of direct democracy that refers to a process whereby an electorate is able to recall an elected representative for under-performance, corruption, or mismanagement while still in office, by filing a petition that triggers a reelection usually after a particular percentage of people sign the petition.

·         Currently, provisions for RTR are prescribed for local elections in Chhattisgarh,517 Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Maharashtra and there are demands for introducing this system at the state and parliamentary level.

Problems

·         However, proponents of RTR have not detailed the governing procedural framework, namely the percentage of electors needed to sign the petition; the grounds for initiating recall, or indeed whether any grounds are necessary; the minimum period, if any, after which recall can be initiated; nor specified the authority competent to decide whether to commence the recall based on the satisfaction of certain pre-conditions.

·          Other questions such as determining whether voters who did not vote in the original election can initiate a recall, whether there can be repeated recall petitions, and whether the recall representative is disqualified from standing in the bye-elections from that or any constituency also require consensus.

·         The NCRWC in its 2001 report did not favour the introduction of RTR finding it either “impracticable or unnecessary.”

Analysing the Arguments For and Against the RTR

Arguments for -

·         The arguments supporting the RTR primarily emphasise the importance of direct democracy in holding elected representatives to account by requiring them to seek post-election approval of their electorates.

·          By providing a tool to dissatisfied citizens to rectify their mistake through “deelection” of their representatives, RTR serves to deter their underperformance, mis-management, corruption, or apathy.

·         Supporters also point out that currently, electoral sanction in the forthcoming elections (often five years away) is the only means of registering dissatisfaction, and given the absence of any continuing monitoring or accountability mechanism, RTR is an important step forward.

·         The consequent improvement in public trust in governance, insofar as many politicians will deliver good performances and reduce instances of corruption under threat of recall.

·         the RTR may also deter candidates from spending excess amounts during their campaign, for a fear of being recalled.

·         An incidental benefit is that it will result in voters continually monitoring and assessing political performance in a bid to determine whether they want to exercise their RTR.

Argument against

·         First, RTR can lead to an “excess of democracy”,wherein the threat of recall undermines the independence of the elected representatives – they will either pander to the majoritarian preferences and prejudices at the expense of safeguarding minority interests in passing populist measures.

·         They will resort to a “clientelist distribution of patronage”, whereby the elected representatives will use fear or mfavour to ensure that they are not recalled.

·          Short-term gains and instant results will be preferred over long-term, unpopular although beneficial policies. former CEC, S.Y. Qureshi notes the RTR can lead to greater instability and chaos, with various attempts being made by vested interests (either other political parties or opponents within the same party) to trigger the RTR on the smallest of issues and as soon as will be permissible

·         RTR ignore the larger issues of political reform such as decriminalisation, curtailing money in politics, internal democracy, and increased public awareness necessary to improve the quality of representation. Progress in these areas may eventually make the demand for RTR redundant.

·         Mr. S.Y. Qureshi  points out that populated state and parliamentary constituencies in India (unlike in Switzerland or even the US) will result in a large number of signatures required to initiate a recall petition, going into lakhs. Not only will the ECI have to verify the authenticity of every single signature to prevent fraud, it will also have to determine whether the,signatures are genuine and consensual or obtained via fraud or coercion.

·         On the possibility of misuse, there is a fear that the RTR will be used by dominant caste members to harass lower caste elected representatives.

·         the Law Commission is not in favour of introducing the RTR in any form.

Comparative Practices

·         In the U.S., 19 states allow the recall of elected state representatives, although there have only been two successful recall gubernatorial attempts – in North Dakota in 1921 and California in 2003.

·         Venezuela is the only country to have a constitutional RTR, since its introduction into Venezuelan law in 1999 under the new Constitution’s Article 72. The RTR can also be applied against the Head of State, and was in fact used against President Hugo Chavez, who survived a recall election with 60% of the vote.

·         The UK is the latest country to introduce the RTR