COMPULSORY VOTING
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The
idea of making voting compulsory in response to declining voter turnout in
elections have been debated for many years.
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Provisions
regarding voting have been enshrined in the RP Act and the Indian Constitution,
and describe the exercise as a ‘right’, instead of a ‘duty’.
·
Thus,
s. 62 of the RP Act expressly talks about the “right to vote” and s.79(d)
clarifies that the “electoral right” of the voter includes the right to “vote
or refrain from voting at an election.
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The
characterisation of the decision to vote as a right, instead of a duty, has
received judicial support.
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For instance, in PUCL v Union of India, the
Supreme Court expressly clarified that the right to vote is a “pure and simple
statutory right.
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It
is thus clear that the decision to vote is considered an exercise of such a
right, and is not a duty prescribed under Part IVA of the Constitution on
Fundamental Duties. However, compulsory voting refers to the practice of making
voting a duty – by requiring citizens of a country to partake in the electoral
process, whether by obliging them to vote or mark their attendance at the
polling place.
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It has been introduced in some parts of world,
both in well established and newly emerging democracies, with a bid to increase
participation in the democratic process.
History and Context
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Compulsory voting was first considered by the
Parliament in 1950 during the enactment of the RP Act. Nevertheless, citing
practical difficulties in implementation, it was rejected (led by members such
as Dr.B.R. Ambedkar)
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Then the Dinesh
Goswami Committee in 1990 considered the question of making “voting
compulsory” to increase voter turnouts .however the Committee rejected the idea
based on “the practical difficulties involved in its implementation.
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Subsequently, in 2001, the Consultation Paper of
the NCRWC on Electoral Reforms again considered, and rejected the proposal for compulsory
voting.
·
Pursuant to this, the issue of compulsory voting
was discussed in Parliament in 2004 and 2009, when two Private Members Bill
introduced a bill to that effect. In 2004, Mr. B.S. Rawat introduced the
Compulsory Voting Bill, 2004 “to provide for compulsory voting by the
electorate in the country and for matters connected therewith, be taken into
consideration.
·
The Bill was defeated by citing various
arguments, inter alia, the coercive nature of the provision; respecting the
active decision of some voters to not engage with the democratic process; the
inability to reach the polling booths; personal circumstances; and the
difficulty of implementation.
·
Finally, Mr. Atul Saronde petitioned the Supreme
Court vide a PIL, urging it make voting compulsory to counter low voter
turnouts and to ensure the ‘representativeness’ of the elected governments
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Dismissing the petition in April, 2009, the
two-judge bench of Chief Justice Balakrishnan and Justice Sathasivam said, “We
are not agreeable to your suggestion that electricity and water connection
should be cut if anyone does not vote. These are inhuman methods to make a
voter go to the polling booth
·
the Gujarat Local Authorities Laws (Amendment)
Bill, 2009 was introduced and (now) passed introducing compulsory voting at
local-level elections such as at the Municipality, Municipal Corporation, and
Panchayat level.
·
a private member’s bill on Compulsory Voting
moved by Janardan Singh in the year 2015.
Evaluating the Arguments
For and Against Compulsory Voting
1 . Participation: Does
compulsory voting increase voter turnouts and improve the quality of political
engagement?
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These involved the effect of compulsory voting
in countering voter apathy by increasing turnout and in making the electorate
more politically aware and engaged.
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Increase in voter turnouts
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A comprehensive cross-country Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (hereinafter “IDEA”) Study reveals that the
difference in voter turnouts between the 28 countries with compulsory voting
provisions on their statute books (regardless of enforcement levels) and the 171
countries without such provisions is 7.37%.
·
Nevertheless, an increase in participation is a
direct corollary of the severity and strict enforcement of sanctions. Studies
have found that levels of abstention in compulsory voting regimes are highest
when the quantum/type of penalty and the likelihood of its enforcement are
high.There are two major impediments arising from this penalty-enforcement
conundrum in the replication of such high levels of turnout in India – the imposition of a heavy penalty, and being likely to enforce it.
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The first
is concerned with the determining the type of penalty.
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The current law is silent on the form of
sanction, and clearly leaves such determination to the government.
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Consequently, it is unclear whether the penalty
will amount to unnecessary coercion (as the “inhumane” suggestion before the
Supreme Court in 2009 to cut off electricity and water supplies) or merely an
informal sanction.
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Examples of the former are found in Peru, where
defaulters cannot access certain government goods and services; Bolivia, where
they are not entitled to receive their salaries for three months; and Belgium,
where non-voters find it difficult to get a job in the public sector
the penalties include being disenfranchised;
along with the possible denial of BPL cards, driving licenses, passports, and
other services.
Adverse affect
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Such measures are extreme and will
disproportionately and adversely affect the poor or marginalised in India.
·
The solution to non-voting as McMillan points
out “cannot be to remove people from the electoral process.”
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In fact, an unintended consequence of such a
measure is the disincentive on “qualified voters” (which is yet undefined) from
registering themselves on the voter registration lists.
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Moreover, instead of specifying the penalty in
the law, the criminalisation of non-voting has been left to delegated
legislation.This vests great powers with the State, which can use it as a
potential tool for harassment.
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Conversely, if the penalty amounts to informal
sanction – a mere slap on the wrist – then it will not act as a deterrent or
have the desired effect.
The second concern deals with the difficulty in implementation
Implementation (at a subsequent
national level) involves the Election Commission making the more than 800
million eligible voters aware of the new law making voting compulsory.
The Commission has to then expend
time and resources in sending notices to each of the non-voters, conduct
hearings, and subsequently impose and implement the stipulated penalties.
Former Chief Election Commissioner
S.Y. Qureshi, terming the implementation “practically impossible”, cautioned
against adding to the caseload of the already overburdened judicial system.
There are additional concerns
regarding the registration process and faulty electoral rolls – voters lists
often have defects and have names missing
Improvement in the quality of
political participation and debate
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Interestingly, although the Australian example
is widely cited as a successful model of compulsory voting, it has witnessed a
high level (to the tune of 1-3%) of “donkey voting”, which occurs when
apathetic voters simply choose the first name on a ballot.
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there is no evidence that individuals will seek
out more information in a bid to fulfil their voting obligations; and
compulsory voting will not necessarily improve the quality of civic engagement.
Equality: Does compulsory voting ensure the enfranchisement of the
weaker classes?
The participation argument for
compulsory voting has an associated equality dimension to it. The argument
proceeds on the assumption that voter apathy is more prevalent amongst the
weaker, marginalised socio-economic class and thus compulsory voting will
ensure that their voices get heard.
However, such arguments are not applicable in
India, where it is the rich, who often do not exercise their voting rights, and
whose turnout is often lower than the poor.
Democracy: Does compulsory voting increase the ‘representativeness’ of
the government or is it constitutionally untenable?
While democratic
representativeness is a laudable goal, compulsory voting is not the appropriate
means of achieving it. Very simply, the government cannot “force-feed”
democracy by compelling people to vote, because doing so violates the
cornerstone of democracy and our Constitution, which is freedom and individual
choice.
First, Article 326 of the
Constitution makes it very clear that every citizen “shall be entitled to be
registered as a voter at any such election”, thereby providing citizens with an
option of not registering themselves as voters.
The Supreme Court also talks about
the “right” to vote, noting that, “the right to vote for the candidate of one's
choice is of the essence of democratic polity.”
Secondly, as the absence of the right to vote in the Fundamental
Duties prescribed in Part IVA make clear, the Constitution does cast any “duty”
on citizens.
Thirdly, compulsory voting
violates the freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1) of the
Constitution
The Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognised that there is a “fine distinction… between the right to vote and the
freedom of voting as a species of freedom of expression.” 412 Whereas the right
to vote is a statutory right conferred only on the fulfilment of certain
criteria, the actual act of voting (“freedom of voting”) is a manifestation of
the freedom of expression.
Most recently, Fiji abandoned
compulsory voting in 2014, Chile in 2012, and Austria (the last remaining Tyrol
district) abolished it in 2004. Others such as Egypt, Greece, Mexico, Paraguay,
and Thailand have stopped enforcing it.
e, the fact that both Italy (1993)
and the Netherlands (1967) have abolished compulsory voting; and others such as
Liechtenstein and Greece have moved from a strict to a not-strict or
nonenforcement of compulsory voting laws
the Law Commission does not recommend the introduction of compulsory
voting in India and in fact, believes it to be highly undesirable for a variety
of reasons described above such as being undemocratic, illegitimate, expensive,
unable to improve quality political participation and awareness, and difficult
to implement.
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